

# Historical Overview of Dan 11:2-15

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## Introduction

One of the most trying and celebrated incidents ever to confront the Jewish people was the violent attempt of Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175-163) to suppress the worship of God in Jerusalem during the second century B.C.

The outrages of Antiochus and the Jewish response to them are given all appropriate emphasis below. It is popular among preterist and futurist writers to focus attention almost exclusively on Antiochus throughout much of the present chapter.<sup>1</sup> Historicists on the other hand have passed over him in almost total silence.<sup>2</sup> I suggest that there is middle ground between making Antiochus the great center around which all of Dan 11 revolves and ignoring him completely. The persecution of Antiochus and the ensuing revolt of the Jewish Maccabean freedom fighters does figure in the chapter, but only within the present section.

The Maccabean revolt must not be approached as an isolated event.<sup>3</sup> It occurred shortly after political control of Coele-Syria, including Judea, passed from the Greeks who ruled Egypt to the Greeks who ruled Syria. This was a major transition for the Jews<sup>4</sup> and one that had been a goal of Seleucid foreign policy for some time. Its implications for later history were farreaching as well.<sup>5</sup> A general shift was taking place in the balance of power between what Daniel calls the southern and northern divisions of Alexander's empire. This is the point to emphasize and it is a change that illustrates a motif which runs throughout chap. 11, i.e., that the king of the North rises to power over the king of the South. Some variant of this motif is found in each of the chapter's three largest sections.<sup>6</sup>

## Verse 2: Persia

"Now then, I tell you the truth: Three more kings will appear in Persia, and then a fourth, who will be far richer than all the others." (Dan 11:2)

There is a question whether the fourth Persian king referred to in the above verse was the fourth after Darius the Mede (11:1) or the fourth after Cyrus (10:1).<sup>7</sup> Actually, during the year that Darius lived following the conquest of Babylon, both men ruled at the same time. Darius ruled from Babylon as a vassal king under Cyrus while the latter campaigned elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> Cyrus did live longer than Darius, however, and so the four kings referred to in vs. 2 should be counted starting from Cyrus.<sup>9</sup>

The first Persian king after Cyrus was his son Cambyses (530-522).<sup>10</sup> Next was the pretender Smerdis (522).<sup>11</sup> Then came Darius I the Great (522-486).<sup>12</sup> The fourth king referred to in Dan 11:2 was Xerxes (486-465),<sup>13</sup> also known as Ahasuerus (Esther 1:1). See table 1.

Table 1

## Persian Kings in Dan 11:2

King	Dates
Cambyses	530-522
Smerdis	522
Darius I the Great	522-486
Xerxes I	486-465

Darius attempted to extend the conquests of Cyrus and Cambyses by crossing over into Europe. In 513 he campaigned against Scyths living beyond the Danube inside the Ukraine, but his line of supply became overextended and he could not get the Scyths to meet him in a decisive battle. Then on the return trip he was threatened by Greeks in the Bosphorus and the Hellespont. After this he concentrated on consolidating his holdings in Thrace, just over the straits inside Europe,<sup>14</sup> and in western Anatolia. Any major advance into Europe would require better support from his western subjects than he had received up to this point. The grand European campaign that Darius would like to have mounted never became a reality, but his plans for it influenced every aspect of his later foreign policy in the west.

Some time later after Darius' failed attempt to invade Europe a revolt broke out among the Greek cities of Ionia on the Asian mainland opposite Athens (499-493). Darius desecrated temples as well as secular institutions in the process of putting it down.<sup>15</sup> His sacrileges extended to Naxos, an island midway between Asia and Greece, and to Eretria, a city on the island of Euboea just off the Greek mainland.<sup>16</sup> When he attempted to punish Athens for its support of the Ionian rebels, however, Darius was repulsed.<sup>17</sup> At this point his earlier plans for the conquest of Europe became focused on Greece in particular and he determined to pursue that more limited objective on an overwhelmingly massive scale.

There was a conscription for military service that drew cavalry, infantry, and seamen together from every part of the empire. Planning and preparation for the anticipated invasion of Greece took three full years and the resources assembled for that purpose were vast.<sup>18</sup> But in 487 there was a revolt in Egypt and the next year Darius died.

The elaborate Persian attempt to invade Greece finally took place in 480 but it was led by Xerxes--the fourth from Cyrus.

Whereas during the Ionian revolt the three Persian armies had moved independently and rapidly, the host of Xerxes--both army and navy--advanced *en masse*. As it used porters, pack animals, and wagons to transport its gear, the speed of the general advance was that of the slowest animal. Despite the fact that bridges had been built over the Hellespont and the Strymon and the army was driven over under the lash, five months passed between leaving Abydus and invading Attica. During this period there were only three days of fighting. The very size and slowness of the Persian host contributed to its failure. For, when September came and wintry weather was in sight, it was clear that so great a host could not be maintained on the slender resources of central Greece for long.<sup>19</sup>

During the entire campaign there was only one battle on land,<sup>20</sup> fought in the pass at Thermopylae. Xerxes himself took command of the vast Persian and allied forces in the field. Opposing them were some six or seven thousand Greeks.<sup>21</sup>

Throughout the day waves of infantry—Median, Cassian, and the Persian Immortals themselves—passed through the narrow gap to be hewn down in serried ranks. They were outfought by the longer spear and heavier armour of the Greek hoplites and particularly by the Spartans, who retreated, wheeled, and charged with well-drilled precision. Xerxes could not bring his cavalry into action at all, but he hoped by the continued pressure of his infantry to wear down the defence.<sup>22</sup>

Finally a traitor led the Persians up a little known path behind Greek lines. The Greek generals ordered a retreat, but the Spartans and a handful of others disobeyed it. They had not come for the purpose of retreating. The Persians eventually forced the pass, but it was so late in the season that they could not press their advantage and were forced to abandon the invasion.

### Verses 3-4: Alexander the Great

"Then a mighty king will appear, who will rule with great power and do as he pleases. (4) After he has appeared, his empire will be broken up and parceled out toward the four winds of heaven. It will not go to his descendants, nor will it have the power he exercised, because his empire will be uprooted and given to others." (Dan 11:3-4)

When Alexander carried out his later vendetta against Darius III Codomanus (336-330) he was avenging the wrongs done by the former's ancestors against Hellas as a whole.<sup>23</sup> If Xerxes had not attacked Greece (vs. 2), Alexander might not have attacked Persia a century and a half later (vs. 3).<sup>24</sup> In bringing these two facts together the prophecy reveals insight into the forces that would shape events and their interrelationships with each other and goes beyond merely listing the events that would occur.

When Alexander died, on the evening of June 10, 323,<sup>25</sup> he had conquered the entire length and breadth of the Persian empire. But so large a territory could not be left to govern itself and no successor was available. Alexander was survived by a half-brother (Arrhidaeus) who was mentally defective, by a son (Heracles) who was half Persian, and by a wife (Roxane) who was pregnant but still only in her sixth month.<sup>26</sup> The acknowledged interim leader was Perdiccas. The normal procedure would be for Perdiccas to have himself proclaimed regent if Roxane's child were male, or king if the child were female. But it had not yet been born and the troops were in no mood to wait months or years for a leader to emerge who could discharge them and take responsibility for their pay.

A period of intensive bargaining followed in which the most desirable satrapies were divided among those present at Babylon: the appointments were made in the name of the king, but Arrian's evidence of an atmosphere of mutual suspicion suggests that Perdiccas was anxious to satisfy his most prominent supporters and remove them from contact with the king and his troops as soon as possible. . . . Those who were most important at Babylon received the most desirable satrapies: Ptolemy won Egypt; Leonnatus Hellespontine Phrygia. . . . Others were less important. Those who were present required reward for their support, and Perdiccas had no alternative to using the men he had. Lysimachus was given Thrace, Pithon Media; Menander, Alexander's satrap of Lydia, who was also present at Babylon, was confirmed; in Cilicia Philotas, probably also present at Babylon, was confirmed. Laomedon of Mitylene, one of Alexander's favoured

Greeks, was given Syria; Eumenes, another Greek who had supported Perdiccas, was given the as yet unconquered Cappadocia and Paphlagonia: Leonnatus and Antigonus were to conquer it on his behalf. Of the rest, the less important, inoffensive, or immovable were confirmed in their posts which they held under Alexander: the former categories will account for the eastern satrapies, the latter for the likes of Antigonus in Phrygia Major, Lycia and Pamphylia.<sup>27</sup>

At this point there was no thought of actually dividing the empire. There was a central government and its court was at Babylon, at least as long as Perdiccas was there, and the main question was how to administer so vast a territory in a way that would prevent its being divided. A corollary was the question of who would be its sole ruler. The allocation of satrapies was not yet an act of partition. When Roxane's child was eventually born and found to be male it was acclaimed by the army assembly.<sup>28</sup> But by this time attention had shifted elsewhere.

## Verses 5-15: Greek Rule in Egypt and Syria

The only part of Dan 11 in which the kings of the South and North represent Egypt and Syria respectively is vss. 5-15. Directional terms are not introduced until vs. 5 when the territory Alexander conquered would be "broken up and parceled out toward the four winds of heaven" (vs. 4) and after vs. 15 the main protagonists are Roman.<sup>29</sup>

The expression "four winds of heaven" refers to the four points of the compass. Some parts of Alexander's empire lay east of Judea, some west, some north, some south. The shaggy goat's prominent horn was broken off "and in its place four prominent horns grew up toward the four winds of heaven" (Dan 8:8). Here only two of the parts into which the empire was divided receive further attention--North and South.

### Prolepsis

"The king of the South [Ptolemy I] will become strong, but one of his commanders [Seleucus I] will become even stronger than he and will rule his own kingdom with great power." (Dan 11:5)<sup>30</sup>

It is interesting that Seleucus is not one of the first generals mentioned in the distribution of satrapies immediately after Alexander's death. Errington speaks of Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Pithon, Seleucus, and Eumenes of Cardia as "the most distinguished and influential of Alexander's closest friends."<sup>31</sup> All were cavalry (as opposed to infantry) officers and all but Seleucus and Eumenes were members of Alexander's personal body guard.

Three years later (320), at Triparadeisos in Upper Syria, Seleucus appears in connection with Antipater and Antigonus in a passing reference. The former, master of the Macedonian homeland since before Alexander's death and now head of the empire's illusory central government,<sup>32</sup> was unable to pay the troops he had taken over from Perdiccas after the latter's assassination and Antigonus and Seleucus helped to quell the ensuing riot, saving Antipater's life.<sup>33</sup> As a result Seleucus was rewarded with the satrapy of Babylonia.<sup>34</sup> It was a major post, but initially Seleucus was much less secure in Babylon than Ptolemy was in Egypt.<sup>35</sup> After only twenty years, however, he was able to move the capital westward to Antioch in Syria.<sup>36</sup> And

twenty years after that his son Antiochus I ruled all the way from Kabul to Thrace<sup>37</sup> and attempted to assert himself in Macedon.<sup>38</sup>

Verse 5 is a summary of those that follow. The king of the South (Ptolemy I) starts out in a position of great strength, but in time the descendants of a former colleague and possible subordinate (Seleucus I) become dominant.<sup>39</sup> Thus, here as elsewhere, the king of the North rises to power over the king of the South. Individual kings making up the dynasties in question, for the time period we are concerned with, are summarized in table 2.<sup>40</sup>

Table 2  
Greek Kings in Dan 11:5-15

Name	Dates
Kings of the South	
Ptolemy I Soter	323-283
Ptolemy II Philadelphus	285-246
Ptolemy III Euergetes I	246-222
Ptolemy IV Philopator	221-205
Ptolemy V Epiphanes	204-180
Ptolemy VI Philometor	170-145
Ptolemy VII Neos Philopator	145
Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II (Physcon)	170-116/5
Kings of the North	
Seleucus I Nicator	312-281
Antiochus I Soter	280-261
Antiochus II Theos	261-247
Seleucus II Callinicus	246-226
Seleucus III Ceraunus	226-223
Antiochus III the Great	223-187
Seleucus IV Philopator	187-175
Antiochus IV Epiphanes	175-163

Too often the history of the Hellenistic kings on either side of Judea has been told as a monotonous catalogue of intrigues and bickering warfare.<sup>41</sup> While it is true that such things did occur, it is misleading to characterize the history of this period in so general a manner. There is a pattern and purpose in the biblical narrative of what happens to God's people during the century and a half and more between Alexander's death and the appearance of the Romans. There is a gradual shift in the balance of power between the Greeks ruling Egypt and those ruling Syria. The focus of Daniel's attention is on how their various struggles affect God's people in Judea. In the end the balance is tipped in favor of Syria and control of Judea changes hands. This is the main point to make when studying vss. 5-15. At the beginning of the section Judea has Egyptian overlords; at the end of the section she has Syrian overlords. Between these two times a gradual shift of power provides the context for this change.

#### Attempted alliance

"After some years, they [Antiochus II, Ptolemy II] will become allies. The daughter of the king of the South [Berenice] will go to the king of the North to make an alliance, but she will not retain her

power, and he and his power will not last. In those days she will be handed over, together with her royal escort and her father and the one who supported her." (Dan 11:6)

The Ptolemy who proposed an alliance between the two largest divisions of Alexander's empire was only one generation removed from its initial dismemberment. His father had been second only to Perdikkas among Alexander's generals and had been considered as a possible king over the central government as a whole.<sup>42</sup> With great foresight he had turned down that shadowy prospect in favor of making his hold on Egypt absolutely secure, which he knew he could do without undue difficulty and especially after Perdikkas' death.<sup>43</sup>

Ptolemy II had been unexpectedly and badly beaten in the naval battle of Cos (256/55) by an old rival, Antigonus II Gonatas of Macedon and Anatolia. At the same time Antiochus II of Syria was pressing against him on land. Finding it difficult to fight against two such powerful enemies at once Ptolemy decided to try making one of them his friend.<sup>44</sup> Egypt's defeat in the battle of Cos was therefore not only the beginning of the end for Egypt as the dominating naval power in the eastern Mediterranean --once the "Carthage of the Orient"--but also the immediate context for the disastrous political marriage described in vs. 6.

The marriage that Ptolemy II proposed was between his daughter Berenice and Antiochus II, who unfortunately was already married. The new arrangement was duly accepted, however, and in 252 Antiochus repudiated his wife Laodice in order to accept Berenice, who soon bore him a son.

Things did not go according to plan. One reason for this is that Antiochus II already had a male heir (Seleucus II) by his first wife and another is that Laodice was a forceful woman who would not just go away. For six years she and her son lived in exile at Ephesus--until Ptolemy II died at the beginning of 246.<sup>45</sup> Within a matter of weeks Antiochus also was dead.<sup>46</sup> These two facts cannot be a coincidence.

With Antiochus II no longer available to protect his foreign queen, Laodice advanced the claim that her son and not that of Berenice was the rightful heir. The latter cannot have been more than five years old at the time. At this the realm began to polarize around the claims of the two rival queens. Berenice was without her father at this point as well as her husband and so when she sent to Egypt for help it was her brother Ptolemy III who responded. But by the time Ptolemy III had put his fleet in position off Cilicia it was already too late. Berenice and her son were both assassinated and Laodice's son came to the throne as Seleucus II.

North/South conflict: South dominant at first

(7) "One from her family line [Ptolemy III] will arise to take her place. He will attack the forces of the king of the North [Antiochus II] and enter his fortress; he will fight against them and be victorious. (8) He will also seize their gods, their metal images and their valuable articles of silver and gold and carry them off to Egypt. For some years he will leave the king of the North alone. (9) Then the king of the North [Seleucus II] will invade the realm of the king of the South but will retreat to his own country." (Dan 11:7-9)

*Verses 7-8.* For a time Berenice's murder was concealed. Her brother's efforts to save her were not only too late, they were embarrassing because he had acted on poor information.

But for whatever reason Ptolemy III set about to bring the whole Seleucid realm under his control. Seleucus II was not yet on the throne and could for all intents and purposes be disregarded.

In the spring of B.C. 246 Ptolemy III came in person to Antioch, as if in response to a summons from the legitimate heir. He was received with acclamation, marched through Syria eastward to Seleucia on the Tigris to receive the fealty of the eastern satraps, and liberally sprinkled the Seleucid domains with Egyptian garrisons before returning home. It was an altogether incredible performance, and Ptolemy himself can hardly have thought that it would hold up.<sup>47</sup>

For a time Egypt directly or indirectly controlled the lands of both dynasties, except for Asia Minor where Laodice and her son Seleucus II were once exiled and where Laodice continued to live even after her son assumed power.

One of the more interesting facts about Ptolemy III's campaign through the Seleucid east is that he left a garrison in the port city (Seleucia) associated with the Seleucid capital of Antioch.<sup>48</sup> It remained there until the reign of Antiochus III.

The war on his sister Berenice's behalf may have been a fiasco, but the events of B.C. 245-241 otherwise played into Ptolemy's hands. There was no one to hinder him in the Aegean once Gonatas and Seleucus II had perforce to withdraw, and so he was able to reassemble almost all the pieces of his father's domain. And in the balance Egypt gained twenty years of peace. Ptolemy III ruled in security, while the Antigonids, Sparta and the Leagues fought for the control of Greece, and while Seleucus struggled to maintain himself in Asia.<sup>49</sup>

*Verse 9.* Seleucus II was able to expel some of Ptolemy's garrison troops before the above war of 245-241 came to an end, but made only one positive thrust of his own. There was a battle at sea which had no results of any practical consequence. Seleucus' fleet was destroyed in a storm.<sup>50</sup>

North/South conflict: Change  
in the balance of power

His sons [Seleucus III, Antiochus III] will prepare for war and assemble a great army, which will sweep on like an irresistible flood and carry the battle as far as his fortress. (11) Then the king of the South [Ptolemy IV] will march out in a rage and fight against the king of the North [Antiochus III], who will raise a large army, but it will be defeated. (12) When the army is carried off, the king of the South will be filled with pride and will slaughter many thousands, yet he will not remain triumphant. (13) For the king of the North will muster another army, larger than the first; and after several years, he will advance with a huge army fully equipped." (Dan 11:10-13)<sup>51</sup>

*Verses 10-11.* Seleucus II died in 226 and was survived by two sons. Seleucus III ruled in an undistinguished manner for three years and was succeeded by his younger brother Antiochus III (223). Two years after Antiochus III became king Ptolemy III died (221), whereupon Antiochus started campaigning in Syria. Even so it took two more years for Seleucia Pieria, the port city of Antioch, to be restored to Seleucid control (219).<sup>52</sup>

Antiochus, it is clear, could have taken Egypt in B.C. 219-218. Twenty years of peace had taken its toll on the Egyptian army. But if Ptolemy IV had few or no troops in those days, he did possess a minister of considerable talent. The reins of state were firmly in the grasp of his vizier Sosibius, whose diplomacy and determination in those difficult years saved Egypt. Antiochus was given to believe that a large Egyptian army awaited him at Pelusium on the frontiers of Egypt, and while he spent two years in an almost leisurely dismantling of the Ptolemaic strongpoints in Phoenicia and Palestine, Sosibius brought that shadow army from rumor to reality by the unprecedented move of recruiting native Egyptians to take up arms. By the summer of B.C. 217 Sosibius had put in the field a phalanx manned by twenty thousand Egyptians. Under the personal leadership of Ptolemy IV and his sister and future bride Arsinoë, they took up their stand at Raphia near Gaza.<sup>53</sup>

The battle of Raphia was not fought on a small scale. Ptolemy IV had 70,000 foot, 5,000 horse, and seventy-three African elephants; Antiochus III had 62,000 foot, 6,000 horse, and 102 Indian elephants.<sup>54</sup> While Antiochus himself commanded the right wing of his forces with good success, elsewhere the lines commanded by his subordinates broke and were forced to retreat.<sup>55</sup> In the peace that followed he was allowed to keep Seleucia Pieria but lost everything he had fought for in Coele-Syria over the previous two years, including Judea. The time had not yet come for Judea to change from Egyptian to Syrian hands.

Possibly all men at such times are more or less disposed to adapt themselves to the needs of the hour, and the natives of these parts are naturally more prone than others to bestow their affections at the bidding of circumstances. But at this juncture it was only to be expected that they should act so, as their affection for the Egyptian kings was of no recent growth; for the peoples of Coele-Syria have always been more attached to that house than to the Seleucidae. So now [following the battle of Raphia] there was no extravagance of adulation to which they did not proceed, honouring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, altars dedicated to him and every distinction of the kind.<sup>56</sup>

**Verse 12.** Before the battle of Raphia it appeared that Syria would win, but in fact it did not. After the battle it appeared that Egypt had achieved a resounding victory, but this was not the case either.

The victory at Raphia in B.C. 217, it turned out, had been dearly bought. Antiochus III had been held at bay, and for the rest of his reign Ptolemy IV Philopator had nothing to fear from the otherwise distracted Seleucid. But the price exacted by the vizier Sosibius, calculated in terms of cash and as a lien on the future, sealed Egypt's doom. An independent Egypt dragged on its existence for nearly two centuries after Raphia.<sup>57</sup>

When Sosibius enlisted 20,000 Egyptian troops in preparation for Raphia, he accepted them not only into military service but into the mainstream of Ptolemaic society. This represented a dramatic change. Those who ruled Egypt had always kept themselves separate from those who inhabited it.<sup>58</sup> This separation could no longer be maintained. But instead of the new political and economic advantages they expected, the native population got higher rents and a new poll tax. Popular sentiment approached the level of open revolt. For twenty years there was a Nubian secessionist dynasty which ruled from Thebes. This had a negative impact on Egypt's African exports and its sources of gold. And adding to all of its other

problems, in the Mediterranean basin Egypt's two best international markets for grain were preoccupied with fighting each other in the Second Punic War.<sup>59</sup>

*Verse 13.* The next battle for Coele-Syria was fought at Panium in 200 B.C. After Ptolemy IV's death in 204 there was internal dissent as his widow Arsinoë and two ministers Sosibius and Agathocles struggled to gain whatever power they could under the circumstances. The circumstances were not good. Arsinoë was murdered in 203, Sosibius disappeared, and Agathocles was lynched by an angry mob in Alexandria. When in 203 the succession was finally secured to Ptolemy V the undercurrent of public unrest continued.

By 201, two years after the unfortunate Ptolemy V came to the throne, Antiochus III was in Coele-Syria on a campaign that quickly took him as far south as Gaza. For a time he was prevented from going farther by Ptolemy's capable general Scopas.

This time, however, the inevitable could not be postponed. The rival armies clashed in B.C. 200 at Panium near the Jordan's source, and the issue of who was to possess Coele-Syria, contested since the settlement after Ipsus a century earlier, was finally decided in favor of the Seleucids. Except for the ephemeral events of B.C. 147-145, no Ptolemy ever ruled there after Panium, and in the following years Antiochus swept into his net the last traces of the Ptolemaic empire strung along the southern coast of Anatolia. Overseas all that was left to Egypt was Cyprus, and at home the dependency of Cyrene.<sup>60</sup>

Judea changed hands politically in 200 B.C. It had been ruled by Ptolemaic Greeks based in Egypt; now it would be ruled by Seleucid Greeks based in Syria. Political relationships that had served the Jews fairly well for over a century would now have to be reformulated. At the time, however, this may not have been so clearly evident as it seems now in retrospect. The Jews' Egyptian loyalties cannot be expected to have died in the battle along with their former overlords.<sup>61</sup>

North/South conflict: North dominant in the end

(14) "In those times many will rise against the king of the South [Ptolemy VI]. The violent men among your own people will rebel in fulfillment of the vision [*l'ha>Øm»d hÿCEz™n*], but without success. (15) Then the king of the North [Antiochus IV] will come and build up siege ramps and will capture a fortified city. The forces of the South will be powerless to resist; even their best troops will not have the strength to stand." (Dan 11:14-15)

The period of greatest interest in the present section of the chapter is that which has to do with Antiochus IV Epiphanes. I have argued elsewhere that vs. 14 shows Antiochus in relation to the Jews, vs. 15 in relation to Egypt, and vs. 16 in relation to Rome.<sup>62</sup> Thus, in vs. 14 we have a king of the North opposing God's people, in vs. 15 a king of the North opposing a king of the South, and in vs. 16 one king of the North opposing a rival king of the North who subsequently replaces him as the focus of attention in the chapter. The complex events of this period are narrated in Dan 11 with thematic as well as chronological intent. Verse 15 explains the context and vs. 16 the outcome of what happens in vs. 14. All three verses deal with the same set of events but do so with different purposes and different points of view.

*Antiochus IV Epiphanes.* Just as Seleucus III and his successor Antiochus III were brothers--both sons of Seleucus II, Seleucus IV and his successor Antiochus IV were brothers--both sons of Antiochus III. After the battle of Panium Antiochus III had followed his success against Egypt by taking over the former possessions of Egypt as far away as Anatolia and Thrace, just inside Europe. Rome challenged his right to maintain any presence in Europe. There were a number of diplomatic exchanges, Antiochus III persisted, and finally Rome stated that Antiochus would have to leave not only Europe but also Anatolia, which had been part of the Seleucid empire for almost a century.<sup>63</sup> There was war and at Magnesia (190) Antiochus III was quickly defeated by the Roman legions under Scipio Africanus--the hero of the recent war with Hannibal.<sup>64</sup>

By the treaty of Apamea (188) one outcome of the war was a staggering indemnity but another was that Antiochus III would have to send his younger son, later known as Antiochus IV, to Rome as a hostage. Antiochus III died one year later (187) and was succeeded by his older son, who ruled as Seleucus IV. His younger son Antiochus, however, stayed on in Rome and lived there a total of ten years. In 178 he moved to Athens, where he rose to public office.<sup>65</sup> When Seleucus IV was assassinated in 175 the succession would normally have gone to his son, Demetrius, but the latter was now forced to assume the role of Roman hostage and Antiochus IV seized the throne for himself. One reason why he was able to do this may have been that he had Rome's active support.<sup>66</sup>

Antiochus IV was born in 215 B.C. and, coming to power in 175, he would have been forty at the time of his accession. He was not especially distinguished in appearance, with aquiline nose, short cut curly hair, and no beard. He lacked the strong face and muscular neck of his father but may have been taller.<sup>67</sup> On the verso side of his coins the inscription customarily read, *theos epiphanēs* ("God Made Manifest"), hence the title by which he is known to history--Antiochus IV Epiphanes.<sup>68</sup>

By religious conviction Antiochus IV was a Stoic at first, but then largely turned from religion to become an Epicurian.<sup>69</sup> As regards personality he is said to have enjoyed affecting the outgoing manner of a Roman politician seeking office.<sup>70</sup> But his ego was unrestrained and Antiochus was capable of giving way to rage. We have all too good an illustration of this latter point, as described below.

*Verse 14: Antiochus IV and the Jews.* When Antiochus IV became king in 175 the high priest in Jerusalem was Onias III. Politically his sympathies were still with Egypt. Onias' brother Jason (Joshua), however, leaned toward Syria and was able to purchase the high priesthood from Antiochus for 440 talents of silver (2 Macc 4:8)--nearly 15,000 kilograms, more than sixteen tons. At the same time he requested that the city of Jerusalem be granted the status of an independent *polis*, or city of the realm, and accompanied his request with the promise of an addition payment of 150 talents (2 Macc 4:9).<sup>71</sup> For a city to become a *polis* normally carried with it an obligation to institute a Greek system of government and so a list of citizens who would constitute the *demos* of the newly incorporated city was drawn up, although at this time Mosaic law remained in effect as well. Jason was high priest for a period of three years (175-172).

In 172 a candidate (Menelaus) came forward who was even more pro-Syrian than Jason and attempted to demonstrate the fact by offering 300 additional talents of silver in exchange for the high priesthood (2 Macc 4:24). The offer was accepted. But Jason, unlike Onias, did not go away peaceably. He fought to keep his office and had to be driven out by force. He escaped to Transjordan and for a time remained hidden there. Meanwhile one source of the funds

Menelaus promised Antiochus was becoming clear. Items were being drawn from the temple treasury (2 Macc 4:39). Later in 172 Antiochus came in person to visit his newly appointed official.

In 169, three years after Antiochus' first visit to Jerusalem, he returned, but this time he made the mistake of openly plundering the temple (1 Macc 1:20-24). If the high priest embezzled funds from it surreptitiously that was one thing, but for the king to rob it was another. The populace became aroused and soon Jason was back from Transjordan attempting to lead a pro-Egyptian coup (168). Now it was the king who became aroused. If the Jews wanted to dislike him that was something he could accept, but armed rebellion was too strong an expression of their feelings. Jerusalem now lost its official *polis* status. Instead of being lowered to the temple state it had been before, however, it was turned into a *katoikia*, or garrison outpost. The land surrounding it was expropriated and given to Syrian veterans, who brought their various deities into the temple and worshiped them there in cheerful disregard of every Jewish religious sensibility. The Jews at this time, however, could still offer sacrifices of their own.

By 167 Antiochus had gotten tired of the endless series of problems he was having with his Jewish subjects and suspended all native religious observances in the temple. The temple was rededicated to Olympian Zeus, pigs were sacrificed on the altars, and people were forbidden to observe the Sabbath or circumcise their infant sons on pain of death (1 Macc 1:44-50). On Kislev 15, 167 a "desolating sacrilege" was erected on the altar of burnt offering (1 Macc 1:54).

For purposes of interpreting Dan 11:14 this is where our story begins. A man named Matthias and his sons, most notably Judas Maccabeus, determined to resist the blasphemies of Antiochus and took to the hills with a band of fighting men. In time the Syrians were expelled. On Kislev 25, 164, three years and ten days after it was defiled, the temple was ready for worship again and there were eight days of celebrations commemorating the event (1 Macc 4:52-53). Presumably omitting the ten days required to bring about the cleansing of the temple and prepare for its rededication--replacing the burned gates, dismantling the desecrated altar, and clearing away the weeds that had grown up within the temple compound--the total period of defilement was three years to the day (1 Macc 4:54).

There is an important question that needs to be raised concerning the historical self-awareness of the Jewish resistance at this time. The term "desolating sacrilege" (1 Macc 1:54) (LXX *bdelugma eremōseōs*) is reminiscent of Dan 8:13 (Th/LXX *hē hamartia eremōseōs*).<sup>72</sup> The author of 2 Maccabees describes the history he is about to write--summarizing an earlier and longer work by Jason of Cyrene--as, "The story of Judas Maccabeus and his brothers, and the purification of the great temple, . . ." (2 Macc 2:19). And after the Syrians were expelled we find Judas and his brothers saying, "Behold, our enemies are crushed; let us go up to cleanse the sanctuary [*katharisai ta hagia*] and dedicate it" (1 Macc 4:36). Going up "to cleanse the sanctuary" is in turn a transparent reference to Dan 8:14 "then shall the sanctuary be cleansed" (KJV), *kai katharisthēsetai to hagion* (LXX, Th). There can be no doubt that the Maccabees saw themselves as fulfilling a larger destiny and more specifically the prophecy of Daniel in which it was foreseen that the temple would be defiled at some future time and then purified.

The question of the Maccabees' self-awareness is strictly historical in nature. Whether their assessment was accurate or not in an exegetical sense is a separate matter. It is a mistake to assume that because the Maccabees and their followers thought they were fulfilling Dan 8:14 they were actually doing so. In fact they were not. Here is the key to the final clause

in our verse--"but without success" (Dan 11:14). As the resistance matured it took on the goal of establishing a vision, the objective or purpose its founders cherished was to establish a vision, i.e., the vision of Dan 8:14, but this was a task that they could not accomplish because the prophecy they thought they were fulfilling referred to a time and place other than their own.<sup>73</sup>

*Verse 15: Antiochus IV and Egypt.* The above events did not happen in a historical vacuum. The tragedy suffered by the Jewish people in the mid-second century B.C. was not entirely the result of a vengeful whim from an unpredictable king.<sup>74</sup> After the battle of Panium (200), which gave the Seleucids possession of Judea, it was five years until a peace treaty was signed (195). One of its provisions was that Ptolemy V should marry Cleopatra I, a daughter of Antiochus III, when he was old enough to do so. Ptolemy V died in 181 and for eight years Cleopatra survived him, serving as regent for their son. But in 173 she died and power reverted to the viziers. They at once began to plan for the reconquest of Judea.

Antiochus IV did not wait for them to act, but seized the initiative and began a full-scale invasion of Egypt. By 169 he had captured Memphis along with the young Ptolemy VI Philometor. While there he had himself crowned Pharaoh. According to one historian,

It was the first successful invasion of Egypt since that of Darius III one hundred and seventy-three years earlier, for Alexander had not invaded but merely occupied.<sup>75</sup>

It was on his return trip from Egypt in 169 that Antiochus took some 1800 talents from the temple treasury in Jerusalem and united his Jewish opposition. The following year Antiochus was in Egypt again, but this time Rome was no longer preoccupied with Macedon (following the battle of Pydna, 168) and was free to give closer attention to Antiochus' activities. Caius Popilius Laenus was sent to intercept Antiochus and did so at Eleusis on the outskirts of Alexandria. Confronted with the senate's order to leave all he had gained in Egypt Antiochus asked for time to consider, just as his father had done before the disastrous battle of Magnesia some twenty-one years earlier. But Laenus traced a circle around him in the sand and demanded that he make up his mind before stepping outside it. Antiochus swallowed his pride and withdrew.

Up to this point there is nothing in what I have reported that directly concerns the Jews, but as it happens a rumor started to circulate that the king was not merely humbled but dead. This was the information Jason was acting on when he mounted his pro-Egyptian coup in Jerusalem. So when Antiochus became aware of Jason's revolt his frustration and anger at being dislodged from Egypt by a single Roman were at their peak. What had once promised to be an unprecedented accomplishment would now go down in history as a debacle--something to be written about in a patronizing manner if not with open ridicule. It was against this backdrop that Antiochus perpetrated a massacre in Jerusalem and issued the decrees of 167 intended to wipe Jewish worship off the face of the earth.

*Antiochus IV and Rome.* We have gotten a little ahead of our story in order to make clear the part of it that concerns us here. As regards Egypt, Antiochus invaded it. That is the point to emphasize in vs. 15 and with it the proleptic statement of vs. 5 is shown to be true and accurate: "The king of the South will become strong, but one of his commanders will become even stronger than he . . ." As far as vs. 15 is concerned there is no reason why Antiochus should not have completed his dismemberment of Egypt and made his own visit to Siwan--if he had chosen to do so--just as Alexander did a century and a half earlier. The factor that made it impossible for him to stay had nothing to do with Egypt, but with Rome. Rome, however, is not

introduced until vs. 16. In vs. 16 Antiochus meets his successor in a sense. During his reign he was the king of the North. But now he is displaced by the power that removes him from Egypt with nothing more than a word to the effect that he is not wanted there and eventually overruns the land he has ruled--with special emphasis on that part of the land which is located in and around Jerusalem. The introduction of Rome in the chapter is discussed separately in a later paper.

## Discussion

One of the main reasons why Gabriel continues his earlier explanations of chaps. 8 and 9 in chaps. 10-12 is to help Daniel appreciate the contrast between the earthly sanctuary or temple in Jerusalem and the heavenly sanctuary of which it was a copy (Dan 8:13-14). After receiving the 2300 day time prophecy in the first part of the chapter Daniel had been overwhelmed with grief at the thought that for nearly two and a half thousand years the temple in Jerusalem would not be rebuilt, but is shown that in fact the temple he had in mind would be rebuilt in the immediate future (Dan 9:25b), quite apart from the fact that it would be torn down again shortly after the Messiah's life and sacrificial death (9:26) 490 years later (9:27). The decree to restore and rebuild Jerusalem would follow rather than precede the building of the second temple which preoccupied Daniel and would in fact mark the beginning of the 2300 days rather than their end (9:25a). The sanctuary of Dan 8:14, by contrast, would not be defiled until long after the first was forever gone and would not be cleansed until the end of a prophetic period of two thousand three hundred years. Two entirely separate structures were in view and when Daniel finally realized this fact it brought him comfort and peace of mind. It should affect us the same way.

When Christ came as high priest of the good things that are already here he went through the greater and more perfect tabernacle that is not man-made, that is to say, not a part of this creation. (Heb 9:11)

The temple the Maccabees set about to cleanse was on earth. The one Dan 8:14 refers to is in heaven. There was only one sense in which the Maccabees can be said to have failed, but it is crucial in the present context. They did not distinguish between the two temples referred to above. As exegetes we should attempt to benefit from hindsight and avoid making the same mistake. When this is done, it is no longer necessary to cut off the flow of history in chap. 11 at a point midway through the second century B.C. Other things worthy of comment would happen over the next two and a half millenia and the angel wants to point some of them out in this final prophecy of the book. The challenge of Antiochus would not be the only one God's people are called upon to face. In a later age there would be a sustained and concerted attack on those who insist on worshiping God through Christ alone as their great High Priest who ministers in a sanctuary that is not on this earth but in heaven. The earlier attack on those who worshiped God in Jerusalem through a succession of earthly high priests--a succession made necessary because "death prevented them from continuing in office" (Heb 7:23)--would prefigure the later one and serve to clarify the issues involved in it. By studying the one set of events, during the second century B.C., it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of later history.

## Conclusion

The point Gabriel was teaching Daniel in regard to the sanctuary is one that we must learn if the prophecy of Dan 11 is to make any sense when interpreted from a historicist point of view. The prophecy covers a vast expanse of time, beginning in the first year of Darius the Mede (11:1) and ending with an event that can only be identified as the second coming of Christ (12:1-3).<sup>76</sup> Antiochus cannot occupy our attention this long. The events dealt with in Dan 11 are not confined to the second century B.C. or to a combination of the second century and a brief moment of later time in the near future. There is no cramped narrowness and no gap. We are dealing here with the entire sweep of history from Daniel's day (11:1) to our own and shortly beyond (12:1-3). Because the temple attacked by Antiochus in Dan 11:14 no longer exists, while the one in Dan 8:14 must if it is to be restored at the end of the 2300 days, the two cannot be the same and must be sharply distinguished.

In good apocalyptic fashion Daniel is contrasting, or being shown a contrast, between things in heaven and things on earth. He is dealing with events that take place starting in his own day and which extend on into the distant future. If he did not have such a perspective, there is a question how Daniel could be called an apocalyptic writer. It is the nature of apocalyptic to deal with such things.

The contrast between a sanctuary on earth and one in heaven is an integral part of the larger apocalyptic framework for the book of Daniel. The topic is focused but not exhausted by the outrages of Antiochus Epiphanes on the first of these two sanctuaries. When we look for a context for his actions we find them in the transition from Egyptian to Syrian control of Judea which had taken place less than forty years previously. That such a transition took place at all illustrates another important fact about the chapter, i.e., that with special reference to God's people, North rises to power over South. It is a motif we will see again.

Note: All Scripture quotations in this paper, except when noted otherwise, are from the Holy Bible, New International Version. Copyright (c) 1973, 1978, 1984 International Bible Society. For an earlier and more general treatment of the material presented in this paper see Hardy, "Notes on the Linear Structure of Dan 11," *Historicism* No. 7/Jul 86, pp. 5-11.

<sup>1</sup>See Hardy, "The Preterist Model for Interpreting Daniel" (*Historicism* No. 2/Apr 85, pp. 2-13), "The Futurist Model for Interpreting Daniel" (No. 2/Apr 85, pp. 38-47).

<sup>2</sup>See Hardy, "The Historicist Model for Interpreting Daniel" (No. 3/Jul 85, pp. 2-16).

<sup>3</sup>W. Stewart McCullough states that, "The persecution of the Palestinian Jews by Antiochus IV was a singular exception to the general Seleucid practice of religious toleration, and arose in a particular situation existing only in Judea" (*The History and Literature of the Palestinian Jews from Cyrus to Herod: 550 BC to 4 BC* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975], pp. 109-10). This may be true but the more narrow circumstances that provoked this attack have a broader context.

<sup>4</sup>It is true to an extent that, "The commencement of Seleucid rule in Judea probably made little difference to the average Jew. Taxes still had to be paid, and if these now went to Antioch rather than to Alexandria, this did not greatly matter" (McCullough, *History and Literature*, p. 111). But it is not true that the average Jew held public office. The transition from Egyptian to Syrian overlords was one that had dramatically important implications for the ruling elite. More was involved than the ultimate destination of their tax receipts. There was also the question of who would collect them.

<sup>5</sup>Without in any way intending or being conscious of it, he [Antiochus IV Epiphanes] became responsible for the setting up of the first independent Jewish state in over four hundred years, an event with major consequences in world history. It was the unique intellectual climate which followed in Judaea which gave rise to the Christian religion, and it was the inspiration of the Maccabees which supported modern Zionism and the creation of the state of Israel" (C. Bradford Welles, *Alexander and the Hellenistic World* [Toronto: A. M. Hakkert, 1970], p. 124).

<sup>6</sup>There are different ways to approach the structure of Dan 11, even within a historicist framework. From one point of view there are four major sections (vss. 2-15, 16-22, 23-28, 29-45), while from another there are three (vss. 2-15, 16-28, 29-45). In the latter case the chapter's three largest sections are approximately equal in length, consisting of 14, 13, and 17 verses respectively, for a total of 44 verses. Verse 1 belongs with chap. 10 and 12:1-4 is an appendix to chap. 11 that can be distinguished but not separated from the present narrative. The terms "North" and "South" do not occur at all in vss. 16-22 or in 36-39. But the rise of North over South can be clearly seen in vss. 2-15, 23-28 (29-35), and again in 29-45 (40-45).

<sup>7</sup>In Hebrew Dan 11:1 reads *bišnat ʾahat l'dāryāweš hammādî* "in the first year of Darius the Mede," but the Greek Septuagint (LXX) has *en tō eniautō tō prōtō Kurou tou basileōs* "in the first year of Cyrus the king," and the Greek version commonly attributed to Theodotian (Th) has *en etei prōtō Kurou* "in the first year of Cyrus." So in the available Greek versions Cyrus is the king referred to in both passages.

<sup>8</sup>William H. Shea, "An Unrecognized Vassal King of Babylon in the Early Achaemenid Period," *Andrews University Seminary Studies* 9 (1971): 51-67, 99-128; 10 (1972): 88-117, 147-78.

<sup>9</sup>For a general summary of what is known about Cyrus historically see Max Mallowan, "Cyrus the Great (558-529 B.C.)," *Iran* 10 (1972): 1-17. For the theory that the name "Cyrus" was originally an ethnic adjective along the lines of "Africanus," "Britannicus," or "Germanicus" see Ernst Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire: Studies in Geography and Ethnography of the Ancient Near East, Edited from the Posthumous Papers by Gerold Walser* (Wiesbaden: Franz Weiner Verlag, 1968), pp. 344-46.

<sup>10</sup>The names of Cyrus and Cambyses may have a similar origin. "Kuru and Kamboja clearly belong to the area of the Iranian satrapy Gandāra. Markwart recognized Ind. Kamboja in Ptolemy's *Τάμβουζοι*, vi,11, read *\*Κάμβουζοι*, in Bactria. *Kūruš* and *Kanbūžya* are adjectives derived from these ethnics, not necessarily meaning 'king of the K.' as Charpentier assumed" (*ibid.*, p. 345).

<sup>11</sup>"Smerdis" is a form of Persian "Bardiya" based on Herodotus' Greek spelling (Greek *sm* for Persian *b*). Roland G. Kent (*Old Persian*, American Oriental Series, vol. 33 [New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1953]) uses the former spelling in his translation of the Behistun inscription, of which paragraphs 10-13 (lines 26-61) are quoted here: "Saith Darius the King: This is what was done by me after that I became king. A son of Cyrus, Cambyses by name, of our family--he was king here. Of that Cambyses there was a brother, Smerdis [Bardiya, line 30] by name, having the same mother and the same father as Cambyses. Afterwards, Cambyses slew that Smerdis. When Cambyses slew Smerdis, it did not become known to the people that Smerdis had been slain. Afterwards, Cambyses went to Egypt. When Cambyses had gone off to Egypt, after that the people became evil. After that the Lie waxed great in the country, both in Persia and in Media and in the other provinces. (Par. 11) Saith Darius the King: Afterwards, there was one man, a Magian, Gaumata by name; he rose up from Paishiyauvada. A mountain by name Arakadri--from there XIV days of the month Viyakhna were past when he rose up. He lied to the people thus: 'I am Smerdis [Bardiya, line 39], the son of Cyrus, brother of Cambyses.' After that, all the people became rebellious from Cambyses, (and) went over to him, both Persia and Media and the other provinces. He seized the kingdom; of the month Garmapada IX days were past, then he seized the kingdom. After that, Cambyses died by his own hand. (Par. 12)

Saith Darius the King: This kingdom which Gaumata the Magian took away from Cambyses, this kingdom from long ago had belonged to our family. After that, Gaumata the Magian took (it) from Cambyses; he took to himself both Persia and Media and the other provinces, he made (them) his own possession, he became king. (Par. 13) Saith Darius the King: There was not a man, neither a Persian nor a Mede nor anyone of our family, who might make that Gaumata the Magian deprived of the kingdom. The people feared him greatly, (thinking that) he would slay in numbers the people who previously had known Smerdis; for this reason he would slay the people, 'lest they know me, that I am not Smerdis the son of Cyrus.' Not anyone dared say anything about Gaumata the Magian, until I came. After that I besought help of Ahuramazda; Ahuramazda bore me aid; of the month Bagayadi X days were past, then I with a few men slew that Gaumata the Magian, and those who were his foremost followers. A fortress by name Sikayauvati, a district by name Nisaya, in Media--there I slew him. I took the kingdom from him. By the favor of Ahuramazda I became king; Ahuramazda bestowed the kingdom upon me."<sup>12</sup>"That Darius' personal name was Spentadata, hence connecting him with Zoroastrian tradition as son of Vishtaspa, patron of the prophet, is quite unproved. His 'throne-name' may be explained as *darayat* plus *vahush* 'having wealth (good things of life)'" (Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* [New York: Mentor Books, 1963], p. 122). For the circumstances surrounding Darius' accession see Richard A. Parker, "Persian and Egyptian Chronology," *American Journal of Semitic Languages* 58 (1941): 285-95, "Darius and His Egyptian Campaign," *American Journal of Semitic Languages* 58 (1941): 373-77.

<sup>13</sup>"The name Xerxes probably means 'hero among rulers', Old Persian *khshaya-* plus *arsan-*, while Artaxerxes has nothing to do with *-xerxes*, rather it is a Greek explanation of Artakhshassa meaning something like 'having just rule', *arta-* and *khshassa-* (Old Persian form of *khshatra-*)" (Frye, *Heritage of Persia*, p. 122).

<sup>14</sup>N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 178-79.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 208.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 212-13.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 213-17.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 228.

<sup>20</sup>At sea the Persian fleet boasted 1200 triremes. But some 400 warships and as many supply vessels in a single storm. The next day fifteen Persian ships sailed into the hands of a Greek squadron by error. In the end over half the Persian fleet had been damaged or sunk (ibid., pp. 229, 232, 236).

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 231.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Alexander saw himself as more than a Macedonian. "Alexander, like Philip before him, was conscious of--and insistent upon--his Hellenic role in Asia. . . . The Phrygian shore of the Hellespont was far more hellenized than his own homeland, but when Alexander finally crossed over there in the spring of B.C. 334 he saw himself coming as a Greek to an alien Asia, prepared to repay to the full Xerxes' earlier descent on his own spiritual homeland" (F. E. Peters, *The Harvest of Hellenism: A History of the Near East from Alexander the Great to the Triumph of Christianity* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970], 37, 38). According to Hammond, Alexander felt that "Macedon and Greece were engaged in a crusade of vengeance for the sacrilege committed by Xerxes against the gods they worshipped in common" (*History of Greece*, p. 601).

But Alexander also saw himself as more than a man, or at least in direct and personal competition with past heroes who were more than men. "The heroes whom Alexander emulated were principally Achilles and Heracles. The other principal object of his emulation was

Dionysus. Nearchus is the source for Alexander's emulation of two other models, namely, Cyrus and Semiramis, in his march across the Gedrosian desert (Arr. 6.24.2-3; Strabo 15.1.5). Cyrus and Semiramis are of interest in that they, too, show how Alexander tended to conceive of his projects in terms of rivalry with some great model; but they need not form part of the present discussion, since Alexander imitated them on only one occasion, and it was a matter of succeeding where they had failed. With Heracles, Achilles and Dionysus, it was a life-long preoccupation with surpassing their great achievements" (Lowell Edmunds, "The Religiosity of Alexander," *Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies* 12 [1971]: 372). Alexander was not only successful; he was complex. His motives did not all lie on the surface.

<sup>24</sup>In fact Alexander's father Philip had planned such an invasion long in advance. Polybius comments in passing on this circumstance as follows: "I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, but I can by no means allow that they were its causes, unless we call Alexander's crossing to Asia the cause of his war against Persia and Antiochus' landing at Demetrias the cause of his war against Rome, neither of which assertions is either reasonable or true. For who could consider these to be causes of wars, plans and preparations for which, in the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many by Alexander and even some by Philip during his life, and in the case of the war against Rome by the Aetolians long before Antiochus arrived?" (W. R. Paton, trans., *Polybius: The Histories*, 6 vols., Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979], 2:3.6.3-5)

<sup>25</sup>R. M. Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C.," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 90 (1970): 75.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 58. It is possible that Roxane was in her eighth month.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 58.

<sup>29</sup>See Hardy, "Linear Structure," pp. 14-16.

<sup>30</sup>To clarify the references to individual kings of the South and North throughout vss. 5-15 I place the king's name in square brackets within the text, as done by C. Mervyn Maxwell in *God Cares*, 2 vols. (Mountain View, CA/Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1981/85), vol. 1: *The Message of Daniel for You and Your Family*, pp. 274-81. Maxwell's work on Dan 11 represents a school of historicist thought other than the one I defend, but any differences do not become apparent until after vs. 13. See Hardy, "Historicist Model," pp. 5-10.

<sup>31</sup>"Noble support for Perdikkas now seems to have consolidated on a large scale, for Photius' version of Arrian's *Successors*--also based on Hieronymus of Cardia--records a list of the senior nobles who chose either side: on the infantry side he names Meleager alone; on the cavalry (Perdikkas'), together with Perdikkas, Leonnatus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Pithon (all *somatophylakes* of Alexander), Seleucus and Eumenes of Cardia. This was a formidable opposition for Meleager, for it meant--if he continued the struggle [to support the claims of Arrhidaeus]--that he had to maintain the support of his troops against the most distinguished and influential of Alexander's closest friends" (Errington, "Triparadeisos," p. 52).

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 70. At Triparadeisos Antipater transfers the central court to Antigonos' headquarters but some months later, under his son Cassander's influence, gets it back in exchange for a contingent of troops.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>34</sup>Errington, "Triparadeisos," p. 70. At the same time Pithon is given Media, Antigones receives Susiana, and as a matter of course Ptolemy's solid control over Egypt is acknowledged and confirmed.

<sup>35</sup>W. W. Tarn refutes the traditional view that Ptolemy I may have been a third cousin of Alexander ("Two Notes on Ptolemaic History," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 53 [1953]: 57-61). What is interesting about the paper in the present context is that Ptolemy I had sufficient stature for such rumors to develop.

<sup>36</sup>There were a number of Antiochs. "Antioch on the Orontes, now Antakya in SE Turkey, some 500 km N of Jerusalem, was founded c. 300 BC by Seleucus I Nicator after his victory over Antigonus at Issus (310 BC). It was the most famous of sixteen Antiochs established by Seleucus in honour of his father. Built at the foot of Mt Silpius, it overlooked the navigable river Orontes and boasted a fine seaport, Seleucia Pieria" (*New Bible Dictionary*, 2nd ed. [Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1982], s.v. "Antioch").

<sup>37</sup>Seleucus I defeated Lysimachus at Corupedium in Anatolia in 282. He crossed over into Europe in August of 281. A few days later he was assassinated (Welles, *Hellenistic World*, p. 66). Seleucus I must be credited personally with the immense achievement of consolidating the satrapies east of Babylon, annexing the satrapies as far west as the Mediterranean coast, and finally conquering as far west as the Aegean coast.

<sup>38</sup>A dispute over Macedon was one of the earliest sources of tension between Ptolemy I and Antiochus I (W. W. Tarn, "The First Syrian War," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 46 [1926]: 155). Antiochus I claimed Macedon for himself while Ptolemy I supported Keraunos.

<sup>39</sup>Alexander's cavalry was reorganized into five hipparchies at some point before the Indian campaign (R. D. Milns, "Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion," *Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies* 7 [1966]: 166). I do not know who the five hipparchs were, but Perdikkas, Leonnatus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Aristonous, and Pithon were all cavalry officers who ranked higher than did Seleucus and Eumenes of Cardia (Errington, "Triparadeisos," p. 52; see n. 31, above). If Ptolemy and Seleucus were both cavalry officers and if Ptolemy ranked higher than Seleucus, it only remains to show that they served in the same hipparchy to justify the conclusion that Seleucus at one time served under Ptolemy, as implied by the phrase *ûmin šārāyw* (lit. "and from [one of] his princes," i.e., officers, vs. 5).

<sup>40</sup>The dates listed in table 2 are drawn from Welles, *Hellenistic World*, pp. 256-59.

<sup>41</sup>"Is there not an appalling sameness about this business of leagues and pacts between rival nations, of disagreements, of wars, of alliances, of political marriages, of recriminations, of treachery, of temporary ascendancy, of defeat and utter downfall, of recovery through some aggressive leader; and then the same thing all over again with a slightly different sequence of events? From this point of view there is a drab sameness about history which allows us to say that, in addition to being a prophecy of a particular period of Syrian and Egyptian history, this may be regarded as a panoramic view of all history in a picture that is idealized, at least to some extent" (H. C. Leupold, *Exposition of Daniel* [Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1969], pp. 475-76).

<sup>42</sup>Errington, "Triparadeisos," pp. 66, 71.

<sup>43</sup>Perdikkas invaded Egypt to recover Alexander's remains, but lost his life in the attempt (ibid., p. 65).

<sup>44</sup>William Scott Ferguson, "Egypt's Loss of Sea Power," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 30 (1910): 194.

<sup>45</sup>Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 162.

<sup>46</sup>Already by the spring of the same year Ptolemy III's fleet was responding to Berenice's call for help off Cilicia, which was issued only after her husband's death. We must assume that Antiochus II was murdered by partisans of Laodice as soon as the death of Ptolemy II became publicly known.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

<sup>48</sup>"For Seleucia had been garrisoned by the kings of Egypt ever since the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, when that prince, owing to his indignation at the murder of Berenice, invaded Syria and seized on this town" (Polybius, 3:5.58.11).

<sup>49</sup>Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, pp. 162-63. In Asia Seleucus II's struggle was unsuccessful. The disturbances caused by Hierax, brother of Seleucus, made it impossible for the latter to give the eastern part of his realm the attention it deserved and as a result he lost Persia.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

<sup>51</sup>In NIV the arrangement of verses is 5-6, 7-10, 11-13. In an earlier paper I divided the text as 5-9, 10-13 (Hardy, "Linear Structure," pp. 7-9). The battle of Raphia (217) and its immediate aftermath occupy vss. 10-12 in my opinion and the battle of Panium (200) vs. 13. Thus, my outline at this point is motivated by historical considerations. The scribe responsible for preparing the famous Leningrad Codex (B19<sup>A</sup> [L]), on which *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelstiftung, 1967/77) is based, must have had similar things in mind because he separates vss. 9/10 with six or seven character-widths of extra space. That the editors of BHS have taken care to reproduce the Leningrad Codex as closely and in as many ways as possible can be seen from passages such as Dan 9:24-26 and Hag 2:6, 9, 18, 19, 22, 23 and from their statement to the same effect on p. xii. I here assume that the arrangement of material on a page reflects the appearance of the original manuscript of 1009 or 1008 A.D. (An exception is the marking of paragraphs with the familiar and [ibid.]). Otherwise it reflects the editors' thought, but for whatever reason the following outline marking devices are used in BHS: (1) poetry: 2:20b-23; 3:33; 4:7b-9, 11b-14a, 31b-32; 6:27b-28; 7:9b-10, 13b-14, 23b-27a; 8:23-26; 9:24-27a; 12:1-3; (2) new line: 1:1; 3:6/7, 7/8; 3:33/4:1 (after poetry); 6:1/2; 7:14/15 (after poetry), 22/23 (no indentation); 9:19/20 (no indentation); 11:2a/b; 12:4/5; (3) space equivalent to six or more letters: 1:2/3, 19/20; 2:4a/b; 4:15/16, 19/20, 30/31; 5:28/29; 6:10/11, 18/19, 25/26; 7:8/9; 8:14/15; 10:1/2, 14/15; 11:4/5, 9/10, 19/20, 20/21, 24/25, 28/29, 35/36, 39/40; 12:7/8; (4) (not in Leningrad Codex): 1:21/2:1; 2:13/14, 16/17, 28/29, 45/46; 2:49/3:1 (new line); 3:23/24, 30/31 (new line); 4:25/26; 4:34/5:1 (new line); 5:12/13, 16/17; 5:30/6:1 (new line); 6:29/7:1 (new line); 7:14/15 (after poetry); 7:28/8:1 (new line); 8:27/9:1 (new line); 9:27/10:1 (new line); 10:3/4; 10:21/11:1 (new line); 12:3/4 (after poetry); 12:8/9; (5) (not in Leningrad Codex): 2:24/25; 3:12/13, 18/19, 25/26; 5:7/8; 6:6/7, 11/12. The point to notice in all of this is that the Leningrad Codex suggests a paragraph break at 11:9/10 and not, as in NIV, at 10/11.

<sup>52</sup>Ever since the days of Ptolemy III there had been a garrison in the port of the Seleucid capital, as noted above. When Antiochus III came to the throne there was a question when to attack Coele-Syria immediately, but the consensus was that the matter of dislodging the Egyptian garrison in Seleucia should receive a higher priority: "For, as he said, it was foolish to covet Coele-Syria and invade that country while permitting the occupation by Ptolemy of Seleucia which was the capital seat and, one might almost say, the sacred hearth of their empire" (Polybius, 3:5.58.4). Seleucia was not the capital as such but the seaport associated with the capital. It lay eight kilometers north of the Orontes river and twenty-five kilometers away from Antioch (*New Bible Dictionary*, s.v. "Seleucia").

<sup>53</sup>Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 164.

<sup>54</sup>Polybius 3:5.79.2, 13; 5.84.5-6.

<sup>55</sup>"For a short time the picked Syrian troops resisted, but those under Nicarchus quickly turned and fled. Antiochus all this time, being still young and inexperienced and supposing from his own success that his army was victorious in other parts of the field too, was following up the fugitives. But at length on one of his elder officers calling his attention to the fact that the cloud of dust was moving from the phalanx towards his own camp he realized what had happened, and attempted to return to the battle-field with his horse-guards. But finding that his whole army had taken to flight, he retired to Raphia, in the confident belief that as far as it depended on himself he had won the battle, but had suffered this disaster owing to the base cowardice of the rest" (Ibid., 3:5.85.10-13).

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 5.86.9-11.

<sup>57</sup>Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 176.

<sup>58</sup>In this connection it is interesting that Cleopatra VII (61-30 B.C.) was the first Ptolemy able to speak the language of her Egyptian subjects (Welles, *Hellenistic World*, pp. 149-50).

<sup>59</sup>Ibid. Welles gives the dates for this war as 218-201 (ibid., p. 106).

<sup>60</sup>Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 178.

<sup>61</sup>Syria and people from the north in general have been traditional enemies of Israel and Judah from earliest times and Egypt has just as consistently been seen as a natural ally and protector (see e.g. Jer 42-43). This follows in part from a combination of Judea's close geographical proximity to Egypt, lying as it does at the southernmost end of the Levant, and the fact that Egypt had superpower stature at various times in its history. Jewish attitudes toward Egypt were not entirely monolithic. At a later time Philo (who lived in Alexandria) could use Egypt as an allegorical symbol for atheism (Pinhas Carny, "Biblical Egypt as a Symbol in Philo's Allegory," *Shnaton: An Annual for Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies* 5-6 [1978-79]: lxx). But the special affinity of Judea for Egypt, and especially in the sense of Egyptian protection, remains an important fact of biblical geopolitics.

<sup>62</sup>Hardy, "Linear Structure," pp. 14-15.

<sup>63</sup>Ninety-one years to be exact. The Seleucids had claimed Anatolia as their own ever since the battle of Corupedion (281), when Antiochus I defeated Lysimachus and extended his territory westward all the way to the Aegean.

<sup>64</sup>The war against Hannibal was concluded in 201. One complicating factor in Antiochus III's dealings with Rome was that Hannibal--defeated only eleven years earlier in 201--was in attendance at the Seleucid court (Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, pp. 248-49. Rome was being cautious as well as rapacious in making its present demands.

<sup>65</sup>Welles, *Hellenistic World*, p. 122.

<sup>66</sup>Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 251.

<sup>67</sup>Few of the Ptolemies or Seleucids wore beards. The above descriptions are based on likenesses preserved on coins. See "Notes on Supplementary Plates, CCXXV-CCXXVII: Coins of the Hellenistic Period," *Greece and Rome*, 2nd series, 10 (1963): 95 ff (plate CCXXVI, number 2). There is no inscription on the side that is shown of the coin representing Antiochus IV.

<sup>68</sup>Peters, *Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 252. A variant form of this title ("Epimanes," i.e., "Madman") circulated among the king's detractors.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp. 251-52. It may be misleading to use the term "religion" unqualified in reference to the various philosophies current in the Greco-Roman world. But when the appropriate disclaimers have been made, "In antiquity Epicurus was accused of being an atheist without the courage of his convictions" (p. 125).

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 252.

<sup>71</sup>Peters refers to Jerusalem under Jason's high priesthood as "Antioch in Judaea" (*Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 254). But a change of name is not required by the evidence. What 2 Macc 4:9 says is, "In addition to this he [Jason] promised to pay one hundred and fifty more if permission were given to establish by his authority a gymnasium and a body of youth for it, and to enrol the men of Jerusalem as citizens of Antioch." This is not the same as enrolling Jerusalem itself as Antioch.

<sup>72</sup>In Dan 11:31 the term is *bdelugma erēmōseōs* (LXX), *bdelugma ēphanismenon* (Th).

<sup>73</sup>See Hardy, "Dan 8:9-12," *Historicism Supplement/Jul 85*, pp. 1-38; "Linear Structure," pp. 9-10.

<sup>74</sup>Peters remarks that, "Religious practices were rarely interfered with--Antiochus IV Epiphanes' treatment of Jerusalem is a rather extraordinary exception . . ." (*Harvest of Hellenism*, p. 237). Other authors have taken a similar position. "Antiochus III, if we are to take as historical the substance of the letter which he wrote to Ptolemy, governor of Coele-Syria (*Ant* xii, 138-44), was kindly disposed to the Jews: those parts of the temple complex recently destroyed he would help to restore, and he promised a contribution to the temple sacrifices. Even taxes were to be reduced" (McCullough, *Palestinian Jews*, p. 112). That was Antiochus III, not IV. And his older son, Seleucus IV, also "supported the temple cultus with gifts" (ibid.). But history is the study of causes and the Jews' misfortunes under Antiochus III's younger son,

Seleucus IV's younger brother, Antiochus IV did not just happen. There were reasons and it is the historian's task to find them.

<sup>75</sup>Welles, *Hellenistic World*, p. 123. Perdiccas had invaded Egypt in order to regain possession of Alexander's corpse in the spring of 320, but was assassinated near Memphis (Errington, "Triparadeisos," p. 65). Antiochus I also failed in an attempt to invade Egypt in 274 (Tarn, "Syrian War," p. 161). What Antiochus IV did do in Egypt was a considerable achievement quite apart from what he was prevented from doing.

<sup>76</sup>For the parallels linking Dan 12:1-3 (11:44-12:3) with 1 Thes 4:16-17 and Rev 19:11-21 see Hardy, "Who Did Daniel See and Speak With in Dan 10?" (*Historicism* No. 10/Apr 87, pp. 12-13).